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HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL SOCIETY,  
PRIVATE LAW: CORRELATION PROBLEMS
Abstract. The category of “human rights and freedoms”, the problems of protection and 
protection of such rights have repeatedly been the subject of research, but the question of 
their correlation with concepts such as “civil society”, “private law” has not been studied 
yet. This circumstance determines the expediency of a special study of this issue. Several 
methodological techniques have been used in the process of exploring issues related to this 
article. The main ones were civilization and conceptual methods. With the help of the “civi-
lization” method, we explored “law” as a category inseparably related to civilization. The 
“concept” method helps to consider law in general, and private law as a concept (conceptus 
from the Latin: thought, representation, concept), that is, as a set of verbal expressions of a 
social phenomenon denoted by a particular term. In the conclusion, the authors state that 
there is a conflict in the field of human rights and the conflict of interests of members of 
civil society, the state resorts to a positive legal regulation of human behavior (taking into 
account the national mentality and influencing the formation and transformation of justice 
in the desired direction). The study reveals that there are no grounds for excessive concern 
about the “infinity” of human rights. This boundary is usually defined naturally, in the face 
of the rights and interests of other members of civil society.
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I. Introduction
The challenges of the 20th Century, 
the largest of which were the First 
(Great) and Second World Wars, influ-
enced many traditional values. The Sec-
ond World War was the impetus for the 
constitution of “sovereignty of the indi-
vidual”, “the status of the individual.” 
With the adoption of the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948 and the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms in 1950, there 
were grounds to call human rights the 
“fundamental value of the concept of 
European private law” (cfr. Kharytonov, 
Kharytonova, Kharytonova, Kolodin & 
Tolmachevska, 2019). But if the under-
standing of the category of “human 
rights and freedoms”, the problems of 
protection and protection of such rights 
have repeatedly been the subject of re-
search (Janice, Kay & Bradley, 1997; 
Paliyuk, 2003 and 2010; Rabinowitz, 
2006; Shevchuk, 2006; Savchin, 2015; 
Jaskiernia & Spryszak, 2016), then the 
question of their correlation with con-
cepts such as “civil society”, “private 
law”, etc., has not been studied so far. 
This circumstance determines the expe-
diency of a special study of this issue.
II. Methodology
Several methodological techniques 
have been used in the process of exploring 
issues related to this article. The main 
ones were civilization and conceptual 
methods. With the help of the “civiliza-
tion” method, we explored “law” as a 
category inseparably linked to civiliza-
tion. From this point of view, the law is 
an element of socio-political order, as 
well as an element of social and individ-
ual consciousness. In this way, the con-
cept of “right” is understood as a civili-
zational category that simultaneously acts 
as an element of socio-political system 
and an element of social consciousness, 
is a component of the spiritual world of 
man and his worldview, and reflects the 
idea of individuals and society as a whole 
about justice, good, humanism, etc. This 
makes it possible to use in the process of 
research the “concept” method, consider-
ing law in general, and private law, in 
particular, as a concept (conceptus from 
the Latin: thought, representation, con-
cept), that is, as a set of verbal expressions 
of a social phenomenon denoted by a par-
ticular term. That the definition of a con-
cept is based on an analysis of the concept 
itself, while the definition of a category is 
repelled by another category is character-
istic. Therefore, the definition of a con-
cept is to convey the meaning of the word 
to which this concept is designated by the 
elements that the concept forms (Bergel, 
2000). This approach is suggested to be 
taken as the basis for understanding pri-
vate law, which is the concept of Euro-
pean civilization, with its methodological 
basis, above all, liberalism. At the same 
time, the consideration of law as a concept 
does not deny the legislative content of 
this concept but eliminates the necessity 
of obligatory evaluation of it as a system 
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relevant legal institutions, etc. In this re-
gard, we have the opportunity to move 
away from a positivist approach based on 
the recognition of the leading role of 
“positive” law and to choose the “natural-
ness of law” as a methodological impera-
tive. The laws of natural law must be 
embodied in positive law, or in religious 
precepts, or in the form of customary law. 
The rule of law should be interpreted as 
a principle of the rule of law. According 
to legal naturalism, the primary sources 
of law are the laws of social nature that 
are actually existing and in force in the 
society, which should be opened by peo-
ple and implemented in the form of posi-
tive legislation. Based on legal natural-
ism, law is a real and socially existing 
laws in the society, and in particular the 
laws of natural law, open by humans and 
embodied by the legislator in the form of 
positive legislation.
While agreeing with the priority of 
natural law in the field of human rights 
protection, we emphasize that this ap-
proach is reflected in the modern vision 
of the essence of law, especially con-
cerning the concepts of “human rights” 
and “private law” in European civiliza-
tion (Kharytonov, Kharytonova, Khary-
tonova, Kolodin & Tolmachevska, 
2019).
III. Presentation of key research 
findings
The expediency of considering mat-
ters of private law as a European concept 
is due to the fact that this category orig-
inates and characterizes European civi-
lization, and thus contains axiological 
guidelines for those who wish to join the 
European Union.
Considering the fact that European 
interstate legal systems and the problems 
of integration with them of the legal sys-
tem of Ukraine have been the subject of 
special study (Lutz, 2003), it is inappro-
priate to dwell on their characteristics. 
Instead, one should establish the essence 
of the term “European law”, which is 
used in jurisprudence and as a general 
concept (that is, as a verbally formed, 
rational and emotional perception of hu-
man rights as part of the world in which 
this person exists, feeling part of this 
world) (Anners, 1996; Entin, Naku & 
Vodolagin, 2001; Topornin, 1998) and in 
respect of particular areas of European 
legal systems (Tolstopyatenko, 2001; 
Janice, Kay & Bradley, 1997).
In doing so, we distinguish between 
the general concept of “European law”, 
which is an element of European civiliza-
tion as a whole, and the concept of “Eu-
ropean law”, in its special meaning, which 
relates to the regulation of relations aris-
ing from the creation and activity of Eu-
ropean international organizations. Pro-
vided that the former has a common 
civilizational, “cultural” meaning, we 
proceed from the fact that it is, by defini-
tion, broader than “European law in a 
special sense”, the sphere of which is only 
the activity and policy of the European 
Union. The characterization of European 
Union law as a sui generis phenomenon 
seems justified (Topornin, 1998), since it 
is, although closely linked to both inter-
national law and the law of different 
Member States (Tatam, 1998), but con-
stitutes a separate, third system of law 
which operates alongside with interna-
tional and domestic law (Muraveiv, 2011).
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We support the understanding of Eu-
ropean law as a system of legal rules that 
have arisen in connection with the for-
mation and functioning of the European 
Communities and the European Union1 
applied within their jurisdiction on the 
basis of and in accordance with the 
founding treaties and the general prin-
ciples of law (Entin, Naku & Vodolagin, 
2001). At the same time, we consider it 
worthwhile to pay attention to the final 
part of the mentioned definition, which 
refers to the general principles of law, 
according to which (along with the 
founding treaties) the rules of European 
law apply. The Treaty of 1992 provides 
that «the Union shall respect the funda-
mental rights guaranteed by the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms and as they derive from the gen-
eral constitutional traditions of the Mem-
ber States as general principles of Com-
munity law» (Art. F).
Thus, the general principles of Euro-
pean Union law are based on the prior-
ity of the rights of the individual en-
shrined in the European Convention, 
which also derives from the constitu-
tional traditions of the European states. 
The same traditions determine the fur-
ther development of the national law of 
the Member States of the European 
Communities.
The above applies to “European law” 
and “European Union law” in general, 
but does not fully take into account the 
particularities of the “private sphere” of 
1   As a rule, we assume that the terms “Eu-
ropean Union law” and “Community law” are 
interchangeable. Cfr. Kernz, 2002.
the existence of law. Therefore, there is 
a need to clarify the nature and charac-
teristics of the concept of “private law”, 
which can be considered in an objective 
(as a public phenomenon that determines 
the legal status of a private person in 
society) and subjective sense (as a right 
belonging to an individual).
The central figure of private law (the 
existence of which is conditioned by the 
existence of private law) is a private per-
son whose defining characteristics are: 
(i) is not a person in the state; (ii) is not 
in the relations of power, neither in sub-
ordination to other private persons; and, 
(iii) is equal and freely, based on the dis-
positive method of legal regulation, de-
termines for itself the rights and obliga-
tions in the relations arising from its 
initiative (Kharytonov, 2006).
At the level of national legal systems, 
an individual is (or should be) the main 
figure of national constitutions and civil 
law, which is a set of rules and norms 
concerning the determination of the sta-
tus and protection of the interests of in-
dividuals (private) persons who are not 
party of the state, which are not found in 
power or subordination relations, equal-
ly and freely establish their rights and 
responsibilities in the relations arising 
from their initiative.
In terms of civil law, a human is the 
main content of the key concept of a 
“person’s status”. This makes it desirable 
to characterize this concept. Therefore, 
the characterization of this concept is 
appropriate.
In Latin status means “status” and 
“state” and denotes (in its original mean-
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ety, and the totality of all (or part) of its 
legal rights and obligations (Bartoshek, 
1989). According to this interpretation, 
the status of a legal entity is usually un-
derstood to mean its legal status, which is 
characterized by the presence of a com-
plex of legal rights and obligations. In 
doing so, they sometimes equate the no-
tions of “legal status” and “legal state”, 
explaining this to the reason that the cat-
egory “legal status” covers all types of 
legal relationships (Halfina, 1974). How-
ever, the equation of these notions is un-
desirable because it eliminates the differ-
ences that exist between the concepts of 
“the subject of law” and “the subject of 
legal relations”. It is therefore advisable 
to use different terms to refer to the legal 
status of the abstract subject and the legal 
status of a real person, which enters into 
legal relations.
The notion “status” includes a sta-
ble, fundamental in the legal status of 
the subject, which, together with legal 
personality, also contains an indication 
of the existence of a certain range of 
fundamental rights and duties. Instead, 
specific rights and duties reflect the spe-
cifics of a person’s real legal position, 
which is mainly related to the presence 
of certain legal facts, not the basis of 
the subject’s general position in that 
legal system.
Thus, the legal status of a person can 
be characterized as a set of fundamental 
subjective rights and duties, that belong 
to the subject of the objective law and 
determine in the most general form of its 
relationship with the state, based on the 
provisions of relevant legal rules. It is 
possible to distinguish the initial legal 
status of a person in a state established 
by the Constitution.
Therefore, the legal status is associ-
ated with the stable legal position of the 
subject, and the legal state changes de-
pending on the legal relationship in 
which it enters.
The characteristic features of the le-
gal status are:
(i) It reflects the state’s (soci-
ety’s) determination of the place of the 
individual in the social communication 
system. This place is enshrined through 
the appropriate procedure and in the ap-
propriate legislative form.
(ii) Its content, which has certain sta-
bility and changes not because of the will 
of individuals, but because of the public-
legal order as a result of expressing in 
some way the will of the legislator.
(iii) Elements of legal status: general 
rights and duties of the subject of the 
objective law. Its legal responsibility is 
formulated and exists in the form of legal 
prescriptions.
(iv) Elements of legal status have the 
qualities of scale, generality. 
They define the boundaries within 
which a person’s legal position, subjec-
tive rights, and duties are formed. The 
presence in the legal status of these at-
tributes allows acting as a legal measure 
of social freedom (Kuchinskyi, 1978).
The status of a person is not only en-
shrined in the Constitution but also re-
flected in the principles of civil law (leg-
islation), by which we understand the 
fundamental ideas according to which 
the relations constituting the subject of 
civil law are regulated. In each of these 
principles, the vision of the essence of 
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these relations are manifested, certain 
requirements are put forward for the 
practical provision of the legal status of 
an individual.
In this regard, civil law refers to the 
fundamental ideas according to which 
the regulation of civil relations is carried 
out. At the same time, subjective civil 
rights (including human rights) refer to 
fundamental ideas that determine the 
content, limits, and order of exercising 
such a right.
It may also refer to the “general legal 
status” and “special legal statuses” of an 
individual. These concepts are in this 
case understood as defining a person’s 
position in terms of preference for pri-
vate or public interest. At the same time, 
both statuses of the person are stable, 
they are changed not by the will of the 
subject, but in public law order. They are 
the totality of the fundamental rights and 
obligations stipulated by the legal acts in 
the form of legal abstraction.
It follows that, since acts of legisla-
tion can determine both general and spe-
cial legal statuses, the question arises 
about the methodological basis for es-
tablishing the principles of legislation, 
which determine the general and special 
private (civil) status of a person and en-
sure the differentiation of special sta-
tuses.
In our opinion, the primary criterion 
for the determination should be the con-
sideration of the legal sphere in which 
the individual resides. After all, the def-
inition of the status of an individual de-
pends on the subject of the relationship 
in which sphere (private or public) it acts 
in one way or another. The bases for de-
termining one’s status in the aforemen-
tioned areas are not and cannot be the 
same, which is caused by different con-
ceptual approaches to determining one’s 
status in both systems.
As K. F. von Savigny (2011) noted, 
in public law, the whole (state) is the goal 
and the individual is subordinate, while 
in private law, each individual is in itself 
a goal, and any legal relation to its exis-
tence or special position is just a means. 
In the field of private law, an authorized 
person defends his or her own interests, 
the protection is initiated by the subject 
of interest by filing a civil claim, and thus 
private rights can be defined as “self-
defense of interests”. In other areas, the 
protection of violated interests is initi-
ated by state authorities (Petrazhitskyi, 
2000).
In terms of defining the differentia-
tion criteria between private and public 
legal status of a person, it is important to 
take into account the provisions of the 
“willpower theory” of Jellinek, the es-
sence of which is that the right in the 
subjective sense is understood as a prior-
ity of human will, aimed at a particular 
goods or interest. This priority is recog-
nized and protected by the rule of law. 
Will is a formal element, and goods (in-
terest) is a material element in subjective 
law. In turn, individual interests are di-
vided into those that are set primarily for 
individual purposes (the goals of indi-
viduals) and those that are set primarily 
for social purposes. Recognized mainly 
for the public interest, the individual in-
terest is the content of public law. Sub-
jective public law (on its material side) is 
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al based on an individual’s status as a 
member of the state.
Concerning the formal element of 
rights, the priority of the will, Jellinek 
distinguishes two types: dürfen (desire, 
aspiration) and können (opportunity). 
Dürfen literally translates from the Ger-
man as «having the desire to do some-
thing». Jellinek (2004, p. 376) explains 
that in this case, «the rule of law recog-
nizes the corresponding actions of the 
individual as permissible, that is, it al-
lows the individual will to exercise his 
freedom in certain directions». Können 
means «to be able» and here
«law and order can add to the actions 
of an individual that something does not 
belong to an individual by nature 
(…) namely, to give him or her the right 
that some of his or her actions will be 
recognized as legally valid and have le-
gal protection» (Jellinek, 2004, p. 376).
Private subjective law contains both 
dürfen and können, while public subjec-
tive law contains only können. There-
fore, in private law, there is always the 
aspiration (dürfen) and in public law, 
there is only the possibility (können). 
Public rights are not based on those al-
lowed, but only on those granted by the 
authorities. Therefore, they are not part 
of the natural (regulated by the right of 
liberty) but are an extension of the rights 
of natural freedom (Jellinek, 2004).
“Natural” human rights, which are 
the most important element of its univer-
sal status, belong to private law and ex-
ist regardless of whether they are recog-
nized as an objective right or not. In 
other words, they are objective because 
of their naturalness, inalienability from 
a person, and can be characterized as 
being provided by God. Human rights, 
as a concept of private law, are based on 
the principles inherent in the branches of 
the private legal sphere. Such principles 
include autonomy, voluntariness, legal 
equality of participants, dispositiveness, 
coordination, general authorization, le-
gal protection of private interest, etc. 
(Kolodyi, 1998).
We propose to add to this list the 
principle of recognition of the crucial 
importance of humanitarian values, 
which is a priority for the European men-
tality. In this approach, human rights are 
recognized as paramount, while for oth-
er types of legal systems, the responsi-
bilities of the individual are the focus. It 
is only possible to speak of the decisive 
role of legal obligations concerning the 
legal system with a public-legal domi-
nant since it is precisely the existence of 
effective means of public coercion that 
ensures the fulfillment of obligations by 
the parties to the legal relationship. Its 
general principles of European private 
law are based on the priority of indi-
vidual rights enshrined in the European 
Convention. Such traditions define the 
vector of the development of the nation-
al law of the European Union Member 
States against the background of the 
growing share of the moral-axiological 
component of the concept of private law, 
the unconditional value of which is rec-
ognized by human rights and freedoms.
It is worth noting that the concept of 
private law, as well as the related con-
cepts in the field of human rights, are 
criticized for “excessive” democracy, the 
ambiguity of the boundaries of freedoms 
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and human rights in the private sphere, 
abuse of rights, etc. Liberalism is most 
criticized (Weller, 2007; Pronko, 2014). 
At times, the expediency of recognizing 
as a leading criterion the idea of the pri-
macy of human rights in characterizing 
the tradition of law is called into ques-
tion, because «from a global perspective, 
it appears that the only civilization 
(which is based on the rights of the indi-
vidual (personality) as the dominant 
principle) is Western civilization» (Me-
dushevskyi, 2014).
Understanding private law as a con-
cept, which is a set of representations, 
rules and norms that determine the status 
of a person (private person) and provide 
protection of his subjective rights and 
interests, let us further explore how real 
it is possible to consider the danger of 
uncertainty of the boundaries of the 
rights of the individual criticized by crit-
ics of liberalism and individual liberty. 
In this regard, it should be noted that 
recognizing a person’s right to freely 
choose a behavior (which does not harm 
another person) does not in itself pose a 
threat, since human behavior is moral in 
nature and moral behavior is one of the 
most violent sociobiological demarca-
tions (Omelchuk, 2011). However, in 
cases where there is a conflict in the field 
of human rights (as well as in the conflict 
of interests of members of civil society), 
the state resorts to normative regulation 
of human behavior. The state takes into 
account the national mentality and influ-
encing the formation and transformation 
of consciousness in the desired direction. 
This approach was reflected, for exam-
ple, in the conflict decision that emerged 
when Finland refused to recognize same-
sex marriage as legitimate. The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights explained 
that while «some countries have expand-
ed the concept of marriage to include a 
partnership of persons of the same arti-
cle», European laws granting the right of 
men and women to free marriage «can-
not forcibly extend this concept.» The 
Grand Chamber of the European Court 
of Human Rights has found that a State’s 
refusal to recognize same-sex marriage 
does not violate the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. The Court stated 
that, although the convention recognizes 
the possibility of marrying and having a 
family «as a right of every individual», 
the document cannot be interpreted as 
requiring marriage to be transformed 
into a completely different concept, en-
compassing same-sex “marriages.” The 
Court also explained that the European 
Convention on Human Rights «estab-
lishes the traditional concept of mar-
riage, which can only exist between a 
man and a woman.» The applicant can-
not claim that such a conclusion does not 
correspond to «European values that al-
low same-sex marriages» since there are 
only 10 in the European Union of these 
countries and most of the European 
Union members interpret marriage only 
as a union between a man and a woman 
(Gennarini, 2014).
In this sense, examples of rigid cen-
sorship are also interesting, especially in 
the field of cinema, where the grounds 
for restricting the right to marry were 
determined by considerations for the 
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Therefore, we can conclude that 
Western (European) civilization does not 
abandon traditional “universal” values, 
although it tries to define their boundary 
limits. Therefore, concerns about the 
“boundlessness” of human rights are ex-
aggerated, largely driven by socio-polit-
ical speculation. This boundary exists 
and is defined naturally. It is determined 
by taking into account the rights and in-
terests of other members of civil society. 
Therefore, let us further consider the re-
lationship between the concepts of “hu-
man rights” and “civil society”, the 
emergence of which is associated with 
the formation of the postulates of human-
ism and enlightenment (Giro, 2006).
It is worth mentioning here that civ-
il society is sometimes defined by the 
lens of private law. Thus, Chicherin 
(1998) believed that civil society is a set 
of private relations between persons gov-
erned by civil or private law. Such an 
understanding of the essence of civil so-
ciety, in general, reflects its dominance: 
the focus on private relations and their 
regulator.
There is an opinion that civil society 
(acting as a phenomenon of culture and 
obeying the common pattern of a culture 
that defines its structure and develop-
ment) should reflect its peculiarities. Ev-
ery civilization, despite the increasing 
influence of globalization, lives its own 
life and realizes the cultural potential 
embedded in it in various spheres, in-
cluding politics. Each socio-political 
system corresponds to a specific basic 
model of civil society, which in each 
country is manifested in a national-spe-
cific form since in the formation of na-
tional consciousness, the political culture 
of the people involved both universalis-
tic and purely national-cultural and his-
torical elements (Trebin, 2013).
In our opinion, in the above position 
there is a shift of emphasis: the presence 
of “purely national-cultural and histori-
cal elements” does not mean the creation 
of a “special basic model of civil soci-
ety”. When considering such phenome-
na, it is necessary to take into account 
the presence of not only universal and 
national – special but also separate, “spe-
cific”. If the universal applies to all so-
cio-political categories, then the indi-
vidual defines inherent in only certain 
types of them – one that can be taken as 
a basis by other systems (serve as “basic” 
for them) but does not lose its genetic 
essence. Therefore, it may become “ba-
sic” here for borrowing and be accepted 
by recipients (adapted), but it does not 
become “special basic”. Thus, Roman 
law does not cease to be a “Roman right” 
because of its reception, and civil society 
cannot become a “special basic model” 
in a society where there are no demo-
cratic relations, and which does not rec-
ognize the existence of private relations.
Therefore, civil society is a phenom-
enon (force) that exists in a democratic 
system (the space of democratization). 
Along with him, there are such forces in 
the space as the political elite, the eco-
nomic community (business), the sphere 
of legislation and the state bureaucracy. 
The last two components (which are 
based on general principles of govern-
ment) constitute the essence of every 
modern democratic system. All others 
are certain organizations and groups of 
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people who give the democratic system 
a specific character. At the same time, 
when economic and political communi-
ties are made up mostly of actors and 
institutions to gain power or profit, civil 
society is the sphere of action of ordinary 
people who unite to express their inter-
ests, protect and fulfill everyday needs. 
Civil society is a collection of indepen-
dent and constitutionally protected civic 
organizations, groups and associations 
voluntarily created by ordinary citizens 
in various fields (Howard, 2009). It also 
refers to relations between groups of 
people, but not all groups, only those 
based on general liberal principles close-
ly linked to the development of civil so-
ciety (Howard, 2009) and those which 
serve as the basis for the concept of pri-
vate law.
These circumstances make it advis-
able to consider civil society through the 
lens of liberalism and the market. From 
this perspective, civil society is under-
stood as a sphere of social interaction 
between the economy and the state, con-
sisting primarily of the areas of closest 
communication (in particular, families), 
associations (in particular, voluntary), 
social movements. and various forms of 
public communication. Modern civil so-
ciety is created through certain forms of 
self-constitution and self-mobilization. 
It is institutionalized and generalized 
through laws and subjective rights that 
stabilize social differentiation. Self-cre-
ation (independent activity) and institu-
tionalization do not necessarily imply 
one another, they may exist indepen-
dently of each other, but in the long run, 
both of these processes constitute an in-
dispensable condition for the reproduc-
tion of civil society (Dzhyn, 2003).
From the point of view of liberalism, 
the assessment of the meaning of the 
concept of “human rights” makes it nec-
essary to take into account the peculiar-
ities of the human component of civil 
society (Zaichuk, Kopilenko & Onisch-
enko, 2009; Bilenchuk, Gvozdetsky & 
Slivka, 1999).
It should be noted that in this case, it 
is a matter of a new type of person (Bi-
lenchuk, Gvozdetsky & Slivka, 1999), 
given that he was formed based on the 
division of labor (thanks to his regulator, 
the market; cfr. Smith, 2001). Gellner 
(2004) proposed the category of “modu-
lar person”, the introduction of which 
emphasizes that the creation of civil so-
ciety provides a unique opportunity to 
achieve individualization and, at the 
same time, create political associations 
that balance the state but do not bind 
their members. The lack of modularity 
eliminates the possibility of choosing 
technology based on the principle of ef-
ficiency. Instead, every human activity 
has to be viewed in the light of the many 
elusive and extremely complex relation-
ships that make it an organic, indivisible 
cultural entity. But in reality, only the 
political implications of modularity are 
relevant. A modular person can enter into 
effective institutions and associations, 
which need not be total, ritualized, con-
nected with many connections with oth-
er elements of the social whole, entan-
gled in these relationships. It may leave 
these unions if it does not agree with 
their policies, and no one accuses it of 
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in the face of fluctuating prices but also 
of unions and changing opinions. There 
is no single price, and there is no single 
way of dividing people into certain cat-
egories: all of this can and must change, 
and moral standards will not prevent it. 
Public morality does not come down to 
a set of rules and regulations; beliefs can 
change, and this is not considered a sin. 
The essence of civil society is seen in the 
formation of effective connections, 
which, at the same time, are flexible, 
specialized, instrumental. A significant 
role here was played by the transition 
from status relationships to contractual 
ones: people began to adhere to the con-
tract, even if it did not correlate with the 
established position in society or belong-
ing to a certain community group. Such 
a society is still structured, it is not some 
sluggish, inert mass, on the contrary, its 
structure is mobile and easily amenable 
to rational improvement. Consequently, 
institutions and associations that balance 
the state but, at the same time, do not 
bind together at the hands and feet of 
their members, coexist mainly because 
of human modularity. The emergence of 
a modular person made possible the 
emergence of civil society (Gellner, 
2004).
An important clarification should be 
added to this conclusion: we also take 
into account that the market determines 
the emergence of a modular person, and 
the aggregate of modular individuals 
forms a civil society. Civil society (as a 
certain social reflection of the market 
system) “transcends” the imperatives of 
the market into formulas of freedom, and 
formulas of freedom “transcodes” into 
the social imperatives of democracy. Al-
though a much more rigid determinism 
prevails in a market society, the funda-
mental difference of the market is that it 
allows one to overcome one’s personal 
dependence on the other. Human rela-
tions, social relations are impersonal. 
Probably, they can be interpreted as dis-
torted, alienated forms of human being, 
forms in which things rise above and rule 
over people, but it cannot be denied that 
this governance is rationally prudent. At 
the same time, civil society is not a mere 
reflection of the market, but rather its 
“isomorphic reflection”. For, as the mar-
ket is a system of division of labor, so is 
civil society as a system of distribution 
(division) of thoughts, ideas and asso-
ciations; as free-market prices prevailing 
in the market, so in civil society opinions 
are expressed freely, public associations 
that are not subject to the state are 
formed; as the market lives in the face 
of changing prices, so in civil society 
ideas are spontaneously born and die, 
public opinion changes, people’s asso-
ciations are reformed. And just like in 
the market, in civil society the decisive 
lever of reconciling the diversity of sup-
ply and demand, pluralism of views and 
positions, bringing them into system 
unity (equilibrium), is consent (social 
contract, consensus) (Pasko & Pasko, 
1999).
Therefore, it seems reasonable to be-
lieve that the secret of the phenomenon 
of civil society is that there is an aware-
ness of market determinants. Since the 
reflection of market imperatives in civil 
society is carried out across the spectrum 
of diverse social groups through the 
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prism of their needs and interests, it be-
comes impossible for the solidarity of 
public consciousness and the unanimity 
of public opinion. Instead, the pluralism 
of ideas, thoughts and the diversity of 
political, cultural, professional, and de-
nominational associations that are called 
upon to identify and form these ideas and 
thoughts are natural. No longer does the 
state impose its ideas on society, but on 
the contrary, civil society expresses its 
demands to the state. However, such plu-
ralism is not a chaos of ideas. All of these 
ideas reflect the demands of a market 
economy in terms of the interests of a 
particular group. The taboo only impos-
es on political programs that call for the 
violent destruction of the social order 
itself. In such a society, everyone is giv-
en the choice within a market paradigm. 
Thus, civil society becomes an area of 
spiritual and social freedom. One can 
talk about the limits of this freedom, but 
there is no doubt that civil society creates 
an atmosphere of a subjective sense of 
freedom in each individual, a sense of 
choice of thoughts, associations, unions, 
forms of activity (Pasko & Pasko, 1999).
Although some researchers believe 
that the historical process of the twenti-
eth century revealed the inadequacy and 
danger of the concept of economic lib-
eralism (Afanasyev, 2007), however, the 
proposal for limited state intervention to 
alleviate social problems of society does 
not mean concessions to the ideas of 
civil society. Thus, defining the essence 
of civil society as a result of the har-
mony of a diversity of interests and re-
lationships formed between individuals 
(and associations created by them) exist-
ing and operating in a market environ-
ment, we can distinguish the features of 
such a society:
(i) Its emergence as a result of a con-
tract (consensus) between individuals 
who meet the notion of a “modular per-
son”;
(ii) The emergence and existence of 
it based on liberalism;
(iii) Its existence in the conditions of 
the developed civilized market;
(iv) The formula of freedom in it is 
expressed as the social imperatives of 
democracy;
(v) The basis of relations between 
people is the activity of a democratic and 
liberal character;
(vi) It is viewed primarily as a behav-
ioral and institutional phenomenon (un-
like “social capital”; Howard, 2009); and,
(vii) The state does not govern civil 
society, but, after its establishment as a 
rule of law, is obliged to provide condi-
tions of its functioning and life 
(Kuznetsova, 2014), since the principle 
of priority functioning of civil society in 
relation to state power is becoming more 
characteristic of the general dynamics of 
development of modern world civiliza-
tion (Onishchenko, 2014; Kolodyi, 
2014).
However, this concept needs clarifi-
cation related to the expediency of mov-
ing away from a simplified binary vision 
of elevation: the civil society and the 
state. Instead, the three-component mod-
el in which civil society is separated 
from both the state and economic struc-
tures seems more reasonable, allowing 
it not only to play an oppositional role 
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revive its critical potential in a liberal 
democracy. In this case, the rigid “link-
ing” of the concepts of “civil society” 
and “state” to one another disappears, 
and thus the opportunity to consider the 
latter component as a variable that pro-
motes or impedes the development of 
civil society.
There is no doubt that the possibility 
of state interaction with civil society is 
more ensured through public law than 
through private law. But this is a natural 
state of affairs since private law and 
civil society are one- of-a-kind concepts 
that not only cannot exist without each 
other, but cannot be sufficiently charac-
terized beyond their interconnectedness, 
which is related to the homogeneity of 
the basis of their origin and existence. 
The need for government intervention in 
regulating their relations arises because 
of the divergent interests of people and 
their groups; civil society – as Hegel 
noted – resembles a battleground where 
one private interest is constantly at odds 
with another. Since civil society cannot 
cope with these conflicts alone, reconcile 
disparate interests, it shapes the state to 
achieve this goal by establishing legal 
relationships and relationships that cre-
ate governing structures and determine 
the procedures for their activities and 
cooperation. Thus, the state power must 
create optimal conditions for the proper 
functioning of civil society, protect it, 
and help to overcome conflict situations. 
The state that serves civil society is the 
rule of law (Bilenchuk, Gvozdetsky & 
Slivka, 1999) and the basis of their rela-
tions is an ideology that can be called 
“human-centric” (Lotyuk, 2014). In 
some version, these relations are charac-
terized as follows: «A democratic state 
power is an effective and active guide to 
the freedom, physical and spiritual beau-
ty of humans» (Onishchenko, Stoetsk & 
Sunyegin, 2014).
This applies not only to the protec-
tion of human rights and freedoms but 
also to the functioning of the market, 
without which neither civil society nor 
private law is possible. As Friedrich 
Hayek emphasized, market society is 
vainly condemned by anarchy and the 
non-recognition of a common goal. This 
is its merit because it makes people free 
because everyone chooses a goal. When 
people can live peacefully (without set-
ting imperative goals and subordina-
tion), it leads to the creation of a Great 
Society. Therefore, there is a general 
problem of choice between the private-
legal approach (humanitarian ap-
proach) and the public-legal approach 
(public-regulatory approach) (cfr. 
Hayek, 1999). The prospect of choice is 
that replacing the market with a planned 
economy takes away human freedom. 
The power that manages all resources 
controls all aspects of people’s lives and 
activities. There is a single employer, 
any job, the will of the boss is not dis-
cussed. The monarch determines the 
quantity and quality of what consumers 
have to buy (Mises, 1999).
Thus, in respect of all these concepts, 
the state acts as a regulator on demand, 
and these concepts are guidelines that 
complement each other in a democratic 
society, mediating areas: socio-political 
(civil society), economic (market), legal 
(private law).
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IV. Conclusions
Summarizing the results of the study 
(using civilization and conceptual scien-
tific methods) of the problems of interac-
tion between the categories of “human 
rights”, “private law” and “civil society”, 
we can make the following conclusions.
1. Human rights are the basic value 
of modern European civilization, which 
is reflected in the proper definition of the 
legal status of the person (personality). 
Legal registration of a set of basic natu-
ral human rights is usually enshrined in 
national constitutions, the norms of 
which in this field are inherently em-
bodying the provisions of natural law at 
the level of national legislation.
2. In their essence, human rights be-
long to the private legal sphere. At the 
same time, the separation of private-law 
and public-law aspects of human rights 
has the nature of scientific abstraction, 
since the issue of the exercise and protec-
tion of such rights concerns the sphere 
of action of both private and public law. 
This separation is appropriate for scien-
tific analysis, but to find out the real 
situation of the individual, this approach 
is not correct, since in practice there is a 
combination of public-law and private-
legal human rights.
3. Public-law remedies are used to pro-
tect human rights in the rule of law, as well 
as in cases of conflicts in the field of human 
rights, in the event of a conflict of interests 
of members of civil society, when the state 
is forced and justified to resort to positive-
legal regulation of human behavior, na-
tional mentality and influencing the forma-
tion and transformation of consciousness 
in the desired direction.
4. One of the vulnerabilities of the 
modern concept of private law is the in-
determinacy of the boundaries of the 
rights of the individual, which is often 
criticized by supporters of “traditional” 
orthodox values that intimidate the aver-
age citizen from the destruction of fam-
ily values, and the like. In this case, the 
shortcomings are a continuation of vir-
tues: recognizing a person’s right to 
freely choose behavior that does not 
harm another person.
5. It should be emphasized that 
Western (European) civilization does not 
abandon traditional “universal” values, 
although it tries (sometimes empirical-
ly) to define their boundary boundaries 
in the event of a conflict with the latter 
with the rights of the individual.
However, there is a conflict in the 
field of human rights, as well as the con-
flict of interests of members of civil so-
ciety, the state resorts to a positive legal 
regulation of human behavior, taking 
into account the national mentality and 
influencing the formation and transfor-
mation of justice in the desired direction. 
Thus, in our view, there are no grounds 
for excessive concern about the “infini-
ty” of human rights. This boundary is 
usually defined naturally, in the face of 
the rights and interests of other members 
of civil society.
References
1. Afanasyev, V. S. (2007). Adam Smith: The Political Economy of Manufactured Capitalism. 
Moscow: Eksmo.




Yearbook of ukrainian law 
3. Bartoshek, M. (1989). Roman law: (Concepts, terms, definitions). Moscow: Legal lit. Bergel, 
J.-L. (2000). General theory of law. Moscow: Nota Bene.
4. Bilenchuk, P. D., Gvozdetsky, V. D. & Slivka, S. S. (1999). Philosophy of Law. Kyiv: Attica.
5. Chicherin, B. N. (1998). The philosophy of law. Saint Petersburg: Science.
6. Dzhyn, L. K. (2003). Andrew Arato. Civil society and political theory. Moscow: All World 
Publishing House.
7. Entin, L. M., Naku, A. A. & Vodolagin, S. V. (2001). European law. Moscow: Norma- Infra.
8. Gellner, E. (2004). Conditions of freedom. Civil society and its historical rivals. Moscow: 
Moscow School of Political Studies.
9. Gennarini, S. (2014). European Court: Gay marriage is not a human right. Retrieved from 
https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/european-court-gay-marriage-is-not- a-human-right 
(11-XII-2019).
10. Giro, T. (2006). Political science. Kharkov: Publishing house of the Humanitarian Center. 
Halfina, R. O. (1974). General doctrine of legal relationship. Moscow: Legal. lit.
11. Hayek, F. A. von. (1999). Cognition, competition and freedom. Saint Petersburg: Direct- 
Media.
12. Howard, M. M. (2009). The weakness of civil society in post-communist Europe. Moscow: 
Aspect-Press.
13. Janice, M., Kay, R., & Bradley, E. (1997). European Human Rights Law: Sources and 
Practices. Kyiv: ArtEC.
14. Jaskiernia, J., & Spryszak, K. (Eds). (2016). European Human Rights System. Universal 
inspiration – cultural conditions – implementation barriers. Torun: Adam Marszałek.
15. Jellinek, G. (2004). General Doctrine of the State. Santi Petersburg.: Publishing House “Legal 
Center Press”.
16. Kernz, B. (2002). Introduction to European Union law. Kyiv: Knowledge.
17. Kharytonov, E., Kharytonova, O., Kharytonova, T., Kolodin, D. & Tolmachevska, Y. (2019). 
Human rights as the basic value of the concept of private law in modern Europe. Amazonia 
Investiga, 8(20), 477–485.
18. Kharytonov, E. O. (2006). Introduction to the Civil Law of Ukraine. Kyiv: Istina.
19. Kolodyi, A. (1998). Principles of Law of Ukraine. Kyiv: Jurinkom Inter.
20. Kolodyi, A. (2014). Civil society: signs, structural elements, relations with the state. Law of 
Ukraine, 4, 9–12.
21. Kuchinskyi, V. A. (1978). Personality. Liberty. Right. Moscow: Legal. lit.
22. Kuznetsova, N. (2014). Civil society, the state, private law: problems of correlation and 
interaction. Law of Ukraine, 4, 63–70.
23. Lotyuk, O. S. (2014). The question of the relationship between civil society and the state.
24. Journal of the Kiev University of Law, 11(2), 13–18.
25. Lutz, A. V. (2003). European interstate legal systems and problems of integration with them 
of the legal system of Ukraine (theoretical aspects). Kyiv: Institute of State and Law. V. M. 
Koretsky NAS of Ukraine.
26. Medushevskyi, A. N. (2014). Is Russian legal tradition a pillar or an obstacle? Report and 
discussion. Moscow: The Liberal Mission Foundation.
27. Mises, L. von. (1999). The individual, the market and the rule of law. Saint Petersburg: Pnevma.
205
Kharytonov E., Kharytonova O. 
Human rights, civil society, 
private law: correlation problems
№ 12/2020
28. Muraveiv, V. I. (2011). European Union law. Kyiv: Jurinkom Inter.
29. Omelchuk, O. M. (2011). Human behavior: a philosophical and legal dimension.
30. Khmelnitsky: Khmelnitsky University of Management and Law.
31. Onishchenko, N. (2014). On the question of finding a balance in the relationship between civil 
society and the state: theoretical and methodological aspects. Law of Ukraine, 4, 55–62
32. Onishchenko, N. M., Stoetsky, S. V. & Sunyegin, S. O. (2014). To the question of the 
responsibility of the state to civil society. Journal of the Kiev University of Law, 2, 9–13.
33. Paliyuk, V. P. (2003). Peculiarities of the application by the courts of Ukraine of the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Mikolaev: Atoll.
34. Paliyuk, V. P. (2010). Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms: Ukrainian law and the judiciary. Mykolaiv: Ilion LLC.
35. Pasko, I. T., & Pasko, E. I. (1999). Civil society and the national idea. (Ukraine against the 
backdrop of European processes). Donetsk: CSO of NAS of Ukraine, UK Center.
36. Petrazhitskyi, L. I. (2000). The theory of law and the state in connection with the theory of 
morality. Saint Petersburg.: Publishing House “Lan”.
37. Pronko, Y. (2014). Primitivism among jurists is something that is difficult to understand and 
comprehend. Retrieved from http://www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id
38. =542E433E7DF16&section_id=50A6C962A3D7C (13-XII-2019).
39. Rabinowitz, P. (Ed). (2006). Human rights: a socio-anthropological dimension: a collective 
monograph. Proceedings of the Lviv Laboratory for Human Rights and a Citizen of the 
Research Institute of State Construction and Local Self- Government of the Academy of Legal 
Sciences of Ukraine. Lviv: The World.
40. Savchin, M. V. (2015). Public Governance, Human Rights and Democracy: A Regional Cross-
section of European Integration. Uzhgorod: Hoverla Publishing House.
41. Savigny, F. K. (2011). The system of modern Roman law. Moscow: Statute.
42. Shevchuk, S. (2006). Judicial protection of human rights: The case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights in the context of the Western legal tradition. Kyiv: Abstract.
43. Smith, A. (2001). Welfare of Nations: Research on the Nature and Causes of Welfare of 
Nations. Kyiv: Port-Royal.
44. Souva, Don B. (2008). 125 Prohibited Films: The Censorship History of World Cinema.
45. Ekaterinburg: Ultra-Culture.
46. Tatam, A. (1998). European Union Law. “Abris”.
47. Tolstopyatenko, G. P. (2001). European Tax Law. Comparative Legal Research. Moscow: 
Norm.
48. Topornin, B. N. (1998). European Law. Moscow: Lawperfyer.
49. Trebin, M. (2013). The Western Model of Civil Society: A Conceptual Approach. Gilea: a 
scientific bulletin, 75, 253–257.
50. Weller, M. (2007). Russia and Recipes. Moscow: AST Publishing House.
51. Zaichuk, O. V., Kopilenko, O. L. & Onischenko, N. M. (2009). Modern Legal Encyclopedia. 
Kyiv: Jurinkom Inter.
Published: Revista de Derecho. 2019. Vol. 8. P. 225–244.
